Edwards on "Revealed Religion"

 

979. REVEALED RELIGION.

Add this to No. 977. "In a word: Socrates himself always openly professed, that he pretended to be wiser than other men, only in this one thing, that he was sensible of his own ignorance." 

And particularly they were entirely ignorant of the manner in which "God ought to be worshipped.[…] Accordingly, the very best of them complied with the outward religion of their country, and advised others to do the same.[…] Plato, after having delivered very noble and almost divine truths concerning the nature and attributes of the supreme God, weakly advises men to worship likewise inferior gods, demons and spirits," and dared not to condemn the worshipping even of "statues and images dedicated according to the laws of their country.[…] 

After him, Cicero, the greatest and best philosopher that Rome, or perhaps any other nation ever produced, allowed men to continue in the idolatry of their ancestors; advised them to conform themselves to the superstitious religion of their country, in offering such sacrifices to different gods, as were by law established"; and yet "in many of his writings he largely and excellently proves these very practices to be extremely foolish." 

And "that admirable moralist Epictetus, who, for a true sense of virtue, seems to have had no superior in the heathen world; even he also advises men to offer libations and sacrifices to the gods, everyone according to the religion and custom of his country."

"But that which above all other things these best and wisest of the philosophers were most absolutely ignorant of," was the method in which those that have offended God may be restored to his favor. As to "those divers ways of sacrificing, and numberless superstitions, which overspread the face of the heathen world,[…] the more considering philosophers could not forbear frequently declaring that they thought those rites could avail little or nothing towards appeasing the wrath of a provoked God or making their prayers acceptable in his sight; but that something still seemed to them to be wanting, though they knew not what. (See Plato's Alcibiades, throughout.)"

And as to the immortality of the soul and a future state of rewards and punishments, the greatest and wisest of the philosophers, notwithstanding the undeniable strength of the arguments which sometimes convinced them of the certainty of a future state, did yet at other times express themselves with great hesitancy and unsteadiness concerning it. 

"'I am now,' said Socrates a little before his death, 'about to leave this world; and ye are still to continue in it: which of us have the better part allotted us, God only knows.'" 

And again, "at the end of his most admirable discourse concerning the immortality of the soul, 'I would have you to know,' says he to his friends who came to pay him their last visit, 'I have great hopes I am now going into the company of good men. Yet I would not be too peremptory and confident concerning it: but if death be only as it were a transmigration from hence into another place; and those things, which are told us be indeed true; that those who are dead to us do all live there; then, etc.' 

So likewise Cicero, speaking of the same subject: 'I will endeavor,' saith he, 'to explain what you desire; yet I would not have you depend upon what I shall say, as certain and infallible; but I may guess, as other men do, at what shall seem most probable; and further than this, I cannot pretend to go.' 

Again, 'Which of these two opinions,' saith he, that the soul is mortal or that it is immortal, 'be true, God only knows; which of them is most probable, is a very great question.' 

And again in the same discourse, having brought all those excellent arguments before-mentioned in proof of the immortality of the soul, 'Yet we ought not,' saith he 'be overconfident of it: for it often happens that we are strongly affected at first, with an acute argument; and yet a little while after, stagger in our judgment and alter our opinion, even in clearer matters than these: for these things must be confessed to have some obscurity in them.' 

And again, 'I know not how,' saith he, 'when I read the arguments in proof of the soul's immortality, methinks I am fully convinced; and yet after I have laid aside the book and come to think and consider of the matter alone by myself, fall again insensibly into my old doubts.'"

And Seneca says (Epist. 102), "'Credebam facile opinionibus magnorum virorum, rem gratissiman (animæ immortalitatem) promittentium magis quam probantium.'"The translations in this and in nn. 6 and 9, below, all occur on p. 165 of Miscellaneous Observations. "I easily believed the opinions of great men promising, rather than proving, a most agreeable thing (the soul's immortality)."

And these great philosophers themselves confessed that their philosophy was attended with so much obscurity and uncertainty, and such abstracted speculation and such nice and subtle disputations, that it was no proper or fit means for the reforming of the world of mankind and leading them to happiness. 

Thus Cicero, De repub.,Clarke cites "fragm[ent]." says, "'Profecto omnis istorum disputatio, quanquam uberrimos fontes virtutis et scientiæ contineat, tamen collata cum horum (qui rempublicam gubernant) actis perfectisque rebus, vereor ne non tantum videatur attulisse negotiis hominum utilitatis, quantum oblectationem quandam otii.'""Although the disputes of philosophers contain the most abundant sources of virtue and science, yet compared with the actions of those who govern the state, I am apprehensive that they will be found not to have brought so much real advantage to the business of men, as amusement in their leisure hours." 

So Lactantius,Clarke cites "Lib. 3." speaking of Cicero, says, "Est, inquit Cicero, philosophia paucis contenta iudicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens… maximum itaque argumentum est, philosophiam neque ad sapientiam tendere, neque [ad sapientiam tendere, neque]JE's omission. ipsam esse sapientiam; quod mysteriium ejus, barba tantum celebratur et pallio.""Philosophy, says Cicero, is contented to be known but by a few, and designedly avoids the multitude. Therefore, it is a great argument, that philosophy neither tends to wisdom, nor is itself wisdom that its mysteries are celebrated by those only, who wear the long beard and the cloak." 

"'In this case,' as Cicero excellently expresses it, 'in like manner as in physic it matters nothing, whether a disease be such that no man does, or no man can recover from it; so neither does it make any difference, whether by philosophy no man is, or no man can be made wise and good.'[…]"

"For these reasons there was plainly wanting a divine revelation, to recover mankind out of their universally degenerate state, into a state suitable to the original excellency of their nature: which divine [revelation], both the necessities of men and the natural notions" which the wise heathens had "of God, gave them reasonable ground to expect and hope for; as appears from the acknowledgments which the best and wisest of them have made, of their sense of the necessity and want of such a revelation; and from their expressions of the hopes they had entertained that God would, sometime or other, vouchsafe it unto them." 

"'Ye may even give over all hopes of amending men's manners for the future,' says Socrates, 'unless God be pleased to send you some'" other person to instruct you. "

And Plato, 'Whatever,' saith he, 'is set right and as it should be, in the present evil state of the world, can be so only by the particular interposition of God.'"

"There [JE refers to this paragraph at the end of No. 971.] is an excellent passage in Plato to this purpose, and one of the most remarkable passages indeed in his whole works," as follows:

"'It seems best to me,' saith Socrates to one of his disciples, 'that we expect quietly; nay, 'tis absolutely necessary, that we wait with patience, till such time as we can learn certainly, how we ought to behave ourselves both towards God and towards men.' 

'When will that time come,' replies the disciple, 'and who is it that will teach us this? For methinks I earnestly desire to see and know who the person is that will do it.' 

'It is one,' answers Socrates, 'who has now a concern for you. But in like manner, as Homer relates that Minerva took away the mist from before Diomedes' eyes, that he might be able to distinguish one person from another; so 'tis necessary that the mist that is now before your mind, be first taken away, that afterwards you may learn to distinguish rightly between good and evil; for, as yet, you are not able to do it.' 

'Let the person you mentioned,' replies the disciple, 'take away this mist, or whatever else it be, as soon as he pleases: for I am willing to do anything he shall direct, whosoever this person be; so that I may but become a good man.' 

'Nay' (says Socrates), 'that person has a wonderful readiness and willingness to do all this for you.' 

'It will be; best then' (replies the disciple), 'to forbear offering any more sacrifices, till the time that this person appears.' 

'You judge very well,' answers Socrates; 'it will be much safer so to do, than to run so great a hazard of offering sacrifices which you know not whether they are acceptable to God or no.' 

'Well then,' replies the disciple, 'we will then make our offerings to the gods when that day comes, and I hope, God willing, it may not be far off.' 

And in another place, the same author, having given a large account of that most excellent discourse, which Socrates made a little before his is death, concerning the great doctrines of religion, the immortality of the soul, and a life to come, he introduces one of his disciples replying in the following manner: 

'I am' (saith he) 'of the same opinion with you, O Socrates, concerning these things; that, to discover the certain truth of them, in this present life, is either absolutely impossible for us, or at least exceeding difficult; yet, not to inquire with our utmost diligence into what can be said about them, or to give over our inquiry before we have carried our search as far as possible, is the sign of a mean and low spirit: on the contrary, we ought therefore by all means to do one of these two things; either by hearkening to instruction, and by our own diligent study, to find out the truth; or, if that be absolutely impossible, then to fix our foot upon that which to human reason, after the utmost search, appears best and most probable; and, trusting to that, venture upon that bottom to direct the course of our lives accordingly: unless a man could have still more sure and certain conduct to carry him through this life; such as a divine discovery of the truth, would be.' 

I shall mention but one instance more, and that is of Porphyry; who, though he lived after our Savior's time, and had a most inveterate hatred to the Christian religion in particular, yet confesses in general, that he was sensible there was wanting some universal method of delivering men's souls, which no sect of philosophy had yet found out."

See Clarke's Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, pp. 138–159.Clarke, Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations, 1706 ed., pp. 220–22, 224–25, 228–32, 239, 241, 244, 246–50.

From a general notion that prevailed in the first ages among all nations, that religion was to be taught by a revelation from the gods, all such as gave institutions and rules for religion pretended to have received them from the gods by divine revelation, as Romulus, Numa, Lycurgus, and Styphis, king of Egypt. 

"If reason only had been the first guide in matters of religion, rulers would neither have thought of, nor have wanted the pretense of revelation, to give credit to their institutions: whereas, on the other hand, revelation being generally esteemed, in all nations, to be the only true foundation of religion; kings and rulers, when they thought fit to add inventions of their own to the religion of their ancestors, were obliged to make use of that disposition, which they knew their people to have, to receive what came recommended to them under the name of a revelation." 

This from Shuckford's History in Republic of Letters, vol. 5, pp. 112–113.Shuckford, The Sacred and Prophane History of the World Connected (2 vols. London, 1728), in The Present State of the Republick of Letters. For February 1730 (London, 1730), Article VIII, pp. 112–13.

http://edwards.yale.edu/archive?path=aHR0cDovL2Vkd2FyZHMueWFsZS5lZHUvY2dpLWJpbi9uZXdwaGlsby9nZXRvYmplY3QucGw/Yy4xOTozLndqZW8uODM1NTAx 

transmigration

https://www.josephsmithpapers.org/paper-summary/conversations-with-robert-matthews-9-11-november-1835/1