So I might further observe, that if we have a revelation given in ancient languages, used among a people whose customs and phraseology is but very imperfectly understood, then many difficulties should arise from hence; and that in a very short, concise history, where only some particular facts and circumstances that concern the special purpose and design of that revelation are mentioned, and innumerable others are omitted that would be proper to be mentioned if the main design were to give a clear, full account and clear idea [of the] connected, continued history of such a people or such affairs as the history mentions—I say, in such a case, 'tis no wonder that many doubts and difficulties arise.
3 Nevertheless, I have received a commandment of the Lord that I should
make these plates, for the special purpose that there should be an account engraven of the ministry of my people.
From:
1340. REASON AND REVELATION.
Definition. By REASON I mean that power or faculty an intelligent being has to judge of the truth of propositions, either immediately, by only looking on the propositions, which is judging by intuition and self-evidence; or by putting together several propositions which are already evident by intuition, or at least whose evidence is originally derived from intuition.
Great part of Tindal's arguing, in his Christianity as Old as the Creation, proceeds on this ground: that seeing that reason is the judge whether there be any revelation, or whether any pretended revelation be really such, therefore reason without revelation, or undirected by revelation, must be the judge concerning each doctrine and proposition contained in that pretended revelation; which is an unreasonable way of arguing. (Here see book on "Controversies," p. 190e ff.)4
'Tis as much as to say that, seeing reason is to judge of the truth of any general proposition, therefore in all cases reason alone, without regard to that particular proposition, is to judge separately and independently of each particular proposition implied in, or depending and consequent upon, that general proposition. For whether any supposed or
pretended divine revelation be indeed such, is a general proposition, and the particular truths delivered in and by it are particular propositions implied in and consequent on that general. Tindal supposes each of these truths must be judged of by themselves, independently of our judging of that general truth that the revelation that declares them is the Word of God, evidently supposing that if each of those propositions thus judged of particularly can't be found to be agreeable to reason, or if reason alone will not show the truth of them, then that general proposition that they depend on, viz. that the Word that declares 'em is a divine revelation, is to be rejected: which is most unreasonable and contrary to all the rules of common sense, and all rules of the proceeding of all mankind in their reasoning and judging of things in all affairs whatsoever.
For this is true, that a proposition may be evidently true, or we may have good reason to receive it as true, though the particular propositions that depend upon it and follow from it may be such that our reason, independent on it, can't see the truth, or can see it to be true by no other means than by first establishing that other truth that it depends upon. For, otherwise, there is an end of all use of our reasoning powers, an end of all arguing one proposition from another, and nothing is to be judged true but what appears true by looking on it directly and immediate, without the help of another proposition first established, on which the evidence of it depends.
For therein consists all reasoning or argumentation whatsoever, viz. in discovering the truth of a proposition whose truth don't appear to our reason immediately or when we consider it alone, but by the help of some other proposition on which it depends. If this ben't allowed, we must believe nothing at all, but only self-evident propositions. Then we must have done with all such things as arguments—all argumentation whatsoever, and all Tindal's argumentations in particular, are absurd. He, throughout his whole book, proceeds in that very method which this explodes. He argues and attempts to prove or make evident one proposition by another first established.
There are some general propositions the truth of which can be known only by reason, from whence an infinite multitude of other propositions are inferred, and reasonably and justly determined to be true, and rested in as such on the ground of the truth of that general proposition, from which they are inferred by the common consent of all mankind, being led thereto by the common and universal sense of the human mind. And
yet not one of those propositions can be known to be true by reason if reason considers them by themselves, independent on that general proposition.
Thus, for instance, what numberless truths are known only by consequence from that general proposition that the testimony of our senses may be depended on. (Tindal says, p. 157, reason is to judge whether our senses are deceived.)5 The reality of most sensible things whatsoever, or the truth of all those numberless millions of particular propositions which we have only by the testimony of our senses, cannot be known to be true by reason considered independent of that testimony, and without an implicit faith in that testimony.
So that general truth, that the testimony of our memories is worthy of credit, can be proved only by reason. And yet what numberless truths are there which we have no other way, and cannot be known to be true by reason considering the truths in themselves, or any otherwise than by the testimony of our memory, and an implicit faith in this testimony. So that the agreed testimony of all we see and converse with continually is to be credited, is a general proposition, the truth of which can be known only by reason. And yet how infinitely numerous are the propositions do men receive as truth that can't be known to be true by reason viewing them separate from such testimony, even all occurrences, and matters of fact, persons, things, actions, works, events, and circumstances, and all existence that we are told of in our neighborhood, in our country, or any part of the world that others tell us of, that we han't seen ourselves.
So that the testimony of history and tradition is to be depended [on] when attended with such and such credible circumstances, is a general proposition whose truth can be known only by reason. And yet how numberless are the particular truths concerning what has been before the present age that can't be known by reason considered in themselves and separate from this testimony, which yet are truths of that sort, and so circumstanced, that all mankind do, ever did, and ever will rely on the truth of.
That the experience of mankind is to [be] depended on, or that those things which the world finds to be true by experience are worthy to be judged true, is a general proposition which none doubts. And all that is meant by what the world finds true by experience can be meant nothing else than what is known to be true by one or the other of those forementined
kinds of testimony, viz. either the testimony of history and tradition, the testimony of those we see and converse with, the testimony of our memories, and the testimony of our senses. I say, all that is known by the experience of mankind is known only by one or more of these [kinds of] testimony, excepting only the existence of that idea, or those few ideas, which are this moment present in our minds, or the immediate objects of present consciousness. And yet how unreasonable would it be to say that we must first know those things to be true by reason before we give credit to our experience of [the] truth of 'em.
Not only are there innumerable truths that are reasonably received, as following from such general propositions as have been mentioned, which can't be known by reason if they are considered by themselves, or otherwise than as inferred from these general propositions; but also many truths are reasonably received, and are received by the common consent of the reason of all rational persons, as undoubted truths, whose truth not only would not otherwise be discoverable by reason, but when they are discovered by their consequence from that general proposition, appear in themselves not easy and reconcilable to reason, but difficult, incomprehensible, and their agreement with reason not understood. So that men, at least most men, are not able to explain or conceive of the manner in which they are agreeable to reason.
Thus, for instance, it is a truth which depends on that general proposition that credit is to be given to the testimony of our senses, that our souls and bodies are so united that they act on each other. But it is a truth that reason otherwise can't discover. And now it is revealed by the testimony of our senses. Reason can't comprehend, or explain, or show or conceive of any way that that which is immaterial and not solid nor extended can act upon matter, which it cannot touch, and matter act upon that. Or, if any choose to say that the soul is material, then other difficulties arise as great. For reason can't imagine any way that a solid mass of matter, whether at rest or in motion, should have perception, and understand, and should exert thought and volition, love, hatred, etc. And if it be said that spirit acts on matter, and matter on spirit, by an established law of the Creator, which is no other than a fixed method of his own producing, still the manner how 'tis possible to be will be inconceivable. We can have no conception of any way or manner in which God, who is a pure Spirit, can act upon matter and impel it.
There are several things in mechanics and hydrostatics that, by the testimony of our senses, are true in fact, not only that reason never first discovered before the testimony of sense declared them, but now [that]
they are declared, they are very great paradoxes, and if proposed would seem contrary to reason—at least to the reason of the generality of mankind and such as are not either mathematicians or of more than common penetration—and what they cannot reconcile to their reason. But God has given reason to the common to be as much their guide and rule as he has to mathematicians and philosophers.
Even the very existence of a sensible world, which we receive for certain from the testimony of our senses, is attended with difficulties and seeming inconsistencies with reason, which are insuperable by the reason at least of most men. For if there be a sensible world, that world either exists in the mind only or out of the mind, and independent on its imagination or perception.
If the latter, then that sensible world is some material substance altogether diverse from all the ideas we have by any of our senses: color, or visible extension and figure (which is nothing but the quantity of color and its various limitation), which are sensible qualities which we have by sight; and also diverse from any of the sensible qualities we have by other senses, as that solidity which is an idea we have by feeling, and that extension and figure which is only the quantity and limitation of those, and so of all other qualities. But that there should be any substance entirely distinct from any or all of these is utterly inconceivable. For if we exclude all color, solidity, or conceivable extension, dimensions and figure, what is there left6 that we conceive of? Is there not a removal in our minds of all existence, and a perfect emptiness of everything?
But if it be said that the sensible world has no existence but only in the mind, then the sensories themselves, or the organs of sense by which sensible ideas are let into the mind, have no existence but only in the mind. And those organs of sense have no existence but what is conveyed into the mind by themselves, for they are a part of the sensible world. And then it will follow that the organs of sense owe their existence to the organs of sense, and so are prior to themselves, being the causes or occasions of their own existence, which is a seeming inconsistence with reason, which I imagine7 the reason of all men cannot explain and remove.
There are innumerable propositions that we reasonably receive from the testimony of experience, all depending on the truth of that general proposition that experience is to be relied [on] (what is meant by experience
has been already explained), that yet are altogether above reason, and are paradoxes attended with such seeming inconsistencies with reason that reason can't clearly remove nor fully explain the mystery.
By experience we know there is such a thing as thought, love, hatred, etc. But yet this is attended with inexplicable difficulties. If there be such a thing as thought and affection, where be they? If they exist, they exist in some place or no place. That they should exist, and exist in no place, is above our comprehension. It seems a contradiction to say they exist and yet exist nowhere. And if they exist in some place, then they are not in other places, or in all places, and therefore must be confined at one time to one place, and that place must have certain limits. From whence it will follow that thought and love, etc., have some figure, either round, or square, or triangular, which seems quite disagreeable to reason and utterly inconsonant to the nature of such things as thought and affection of mind.
'Tis evident by experience that something now is. But this proposition is attended with things that reason [cannot] comprehend, and which are paradoxes that seem contrary to reason, knots that reason cannot clearly untie. For if something now is, then either something was from all eternity, or something began to be without any cause or reason of its existence. The last seems wholly inconsistent with natural sense. And the other, viz. that something has been from all eternity, implies that there has been a duration that is past, is without any beginning, which is an infinite duration, which is perfectly inconceivable and is attended with difficulties that seem contrary to reason. For we can't conceive how an infinite duration can be made greater, any more than how a line of infinite length can be made longer. But yet we see that past duration is continually added to. If there were a duration past without beginning a thousand years ago, then that past infinite duration has now a thousand years added to [it]. And, if so, it is greater than it was before by a thousand years, because the whole is greater than a part. Now the past duration consists of two parts, viz. that which was before the last thousand years, and that which is since. Thus here are seeming contradictions involved in this supposition of an infinite duration past.
And moreover, if something has been from eternity, 'tis either an endless succession of causes and effects—as, for instance, an endless succession of fathers and sons—or something equivalent. But this supposition is attended with manifold apparent contradictions (see my sermons on the existence of God).8 Or there must have been some eternal, self-existent
Being having the reasons of his existence within himself, or he must [have] existed from eternity without any reason of his existence, both which are inconceivable. That a being should exist from eternity without any manner why it should be so, rather than otherwise, is altogether inconceivable, and seems quite repugnant to reason. And why a being should be self-existent, or have the reason of his existence within himself, seems also inconceivable, and never, as I apprehend, has yet been explained.
If there has [been] anything from eternity, then that past eternity is either an endless duration of successive parts—as successive hours, minutes, etc.—or it is an eternal duration without succession. The latter seems repugnant to reason and incompatible with any faculty of understanding that we have. And the other, an infinite number of successive parts, involves the very same contradictions, with the supposition of an eternal succession of fathers and sons.
If ever the world has existed from eternity without a cause—but this seems wholly inconsistent with reason. In the first place, 'tis inconsistent with reason that it should exist without a cause. For 'tis evident that there is not a thing the nature and manner of which is necessary in itself, and therefore it requires a cause or reason why it is so, and not otherwise, out of itself. And in the next place, if it exists from eternity, then succession has been from eternity, which involves the forementioned contradiction. But if it ben't without a cause and don't exist from eternity, then it has been created-out of nothing, which is altogether inconceivable, and what reason cannot show to be possible; and many of the greatest philosophers have supposed it plainly inconsistent with reason.
Many other difficulties might be mentioned as following from the proposition that something now is, that are insuperable by reason.
'Tis evident by experience that great evil, both moral and natural evil, abound in the world. 'Tis manifest that great injustice, violence, treachery, perfidiousness and extreme cruelty to the innocent abound in the world; as well as innumerable, extreme sufferings, issuing finally in destruction and death, are general all over the world in all ages. But this could not otherwise [have] been known by reason, and now is attended with difficulties which the reason of many, yea, most of the learned men and greatest philosophers that have been in the world, have not been able to surmount. That it should be so ordered or permitted in a world absolutely and perfectly under the care and government of an infinitely holy and good God, has a seeming repugnancy to reason that few, if any, have been able fully to remove.
That men are to be blamed or commended for their good or evil voluntary
actions is a general proposition received with good reason by the dictate of the natural, common and universal moral sense of mankind, in all nations and ages, which moral sense is commonly plainly included in what Tindal means by reason and the law of nature. And yet many things attend this truth that are difficulties and seeming repugnances to reason, that have proved altogether insuperable to the reason of most of the greatest and most learned men in the world.
I observe further, that when the difficulties which attend any general proposition which is recommended to us [as] true by any testimony or evidence that, considered by itself, seems sufficient, without contrary testimony or evidence9 to countervail it, and difficulties attend that proposition: if these difficulties are no greater and of no other sort from what might reasonably be expected to attend true propositions of that kind, then these difficulties are not only no valid or sufficient objection against that proposition, but they are no objection at all.
Thus there are many things that I am told concerning the effects of electricity, magnetism, etc., and many things that are recorded in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, which I have never seen and are very mysterious. But being well attested, their mysteriousness is no manner of objection against my belief of the accounts, because from what I have observed and do know, such a mysteriousness is no other than is to be expected in a particular and exact observation of nature, and a critical tracing of its operations. 'Tis to be expected that the further it is traced, the more and more mysteries will appear.
To apply this to the case in hand: if the difficulties that attend that which is recommended by good proof or testimony to our reception as a divine revelation, and this revelation is attended with difficulties, but yet with difficulties no greater nor of any other nature than such as (all things considered) might reasonably be expected to attend a revelation of such a sort, of things of such a nature, and given for such ends and purposes, and under such circumstances; these difficulties not only are not of weight sufficient to balance the testimony or proof that recommends it, but they are of no weight at all as objections against [it]. They are not reasonably to be looked upon as of the nature of arguments against it. But, on the contrary, they may with good reason be looked upon as confirmations, and of the nature of arguments in its favor.
This is very evident, and the reason of it very plain. For certainly whatever is reasonably expected to be found in truth when we are seeking it,
cannot be an objection against its being truth when we have found it. If it be reasonably expected in truth beforehand, then reason unites it with truth, as one property of that sort of truth. And if so, then reason unites it afterwards, after it is found. Whatever reason determines to [be] a property of any kind of truth, that is properly looked upon in some degree as a mark of truth, or of truths of that sort, or as belonging to the marks and evidences of it. For things are known by their properties. Reason determines truth by things which reason determines to be the properties of truth. And if we don't find such things belonging to supposed truth that were before reasonably expected in truth of that kind, this is an objection against it, rather than the finding of it. The disappointment of reason is rather an objection with reason than something to induce its acceptance and acquiescence. If the expectation be reasonable, then the not answering of it must so far appear unreasonable, or against reason, and so an objection in the way of reason.
Thus, if anyone that is in search for persons or things of a certain kind, reasonably expects beforehand that if he be successful in finding the person or thing of the kind and quality that he is in search of, [it will be possessed of certain properties and circumstances], when1 he hath actually found something with all these properties and circumstances that he expected, he receives it and rests in it so much the more entirely as the very thing that he was in quest of. And surely it is no argument with him that his invention is not right, that some things that he reasonably expected are wanting. But on the contrary, this would rather be an objection with his reason.
In order to judge what sort of difficulties are to be expected in a revelation made to mankind by God, such as Christians suppose the Scriptures to be, [we should remember that it is] a revelation of what God knows to be the very truth concerning his own nature; the acts and operations of his mind with respect to his creatures; the grand scheme of infinite wisdom in his works, especially with respect to the intelligent and moral world; a revelation of the spiritual and invisible world; a revelation of that invisible world which men shall belong to after this life; a revelation of the greatest works of God, the manner of his creating the world and of his governing of it, especially with regard to the higher and more important parts of it; a revelation delivered in ancient languages.
Difficulties and incomprehensible mysteries are reasonably to be expected in a declaration from God of the precise truth, as he knows it, in
matters of a spiritual nature; as we see things that are invisible, and not the objects of any of the external senses, are very mysterious, involved much more in darkness, attended with more mystery and difficulty to the understanding than others; as many things concerning even the nature of our own souls themselves, though the nearest to us and the most intimately present with us, and so most in our view of any spiritual thing whatsoever.
The further things are from the nature of those things that language is chiefly formed to express—viz. things appertaining to the common business and vulgar affairs of life, things obvious to sense and men's direct view and most vulgar observation, without speculation, reflection and abstraction—the more difficult. Our expressions concerning them, when words and language are applied to them, will be attended with greater abstruseness, difficulty and seeming inconsistence; language not being well fitted to express these things, words and phrases not being prepared for that end. Such a reference to sensible and vulgar things from the original use and design of words and phrases is unavoidably introduced, that naturally confounds and loses the mind, and involves it in darkness.
If God gives a revelation of things of religion, it must be mainly concerning those things that are spiritual, or the affairs of the moral and intelligent universe, which is the grand system of spirits, about himself and intelligent creatures.
It may well be supposed that a revelation concerning another and an invisible world, a future state that we are to be in after separated from the body, should be attended with much mystery. It may well be supposed that things of such a world are of an exceeding different nature from the things of this world, the things of sense, and all the objects and affairs which earthly language was made to express; and not agreeable to such notions, imaginations and ways of thinking that grow up with us and are connatural to us, being from our infancy formed to an agreeableness to the things which we are conversant with in this world. We could not conceive of the things of sense if we had never had these external senses. And if we had had only some of these senses and not others—as, for instance, if we had only a sense of feeling, without the senses of seeing and hearing—how mysterious would a declaration of things of these last senses be! Or if we had feeling and hearing but had been born without eyes or optic nerves, the things of light, being declared to us, would many of them be involved in mystery that would appear exceeding strange to us.
(Marginal note: I say, if we were born without eyes or optic nerves for, as to such as are born blind but yet born with optic nerves, I imagine they have some ideas by the state of the optic nerves other than they could otherwise have, as an idea of darkness or blackness, and without that confused intermixture of specks or streaks of light with blackness such as is in prints in mezzotint, which I suppose all have when they shut their eyes or when they are in darkness, and possibly such a kind of lightsomeness on some occasion as we have by pressing our eyes with our fingers when they [are] shut, which confused light is perhaps from some motion of the animal spirits in the optic nerves, though not excited by rays, yet in some degree like that which is excited by a few weak rays.)
Thus, one that was in this manner without the sense of seeing, but had the other senses, might be informed by all about them that they can perceive things at a distance, and perceive as plainly, and in some respects much more plainly, than by touching them—yea, that they could perceive things at so great a distance that it would take up many millions of ages to travel to them.
They might be informed many things concerning colors that would all be perfectly incomprehensible that yet might be believed. And it could not be said that nothing at all is proposed to their belief because they have no idea of color. They might be told that they perceive an extension, a length and breadth of color, and termination and limits, and so a figure of this kind of extension, and yet that it is nothing that can be felt; which would be perfectly mysterious to them, and would seem an inconsistence, as they have no ideas of any such things as length, breadth and limits and figure of extension, but only certain ideas they have by touch.
They might be informed by them that they can perceive at once the extent and shape of a thing so great and multiform as a tree, which is a thing that it would take them many days to perceive the extent and shape of by touch, which would seem very strange and impossible.
They might be told that, to them that see, some things appear a thousand times as great as some others that yet are made up of more visible points, or [at] least visible parts, than they, which would be very mysterious and seem quite inconsistent with reason.
These and many other things would be attended with unsearchable mystery to 'em concerning objects of sight, and what they could never fully see how they can be reconciled with reason, at least with [out] very long, particular, gradual and elaborate instruction. And, after all, they would not be fully comprehensible so as clearly to see how the ideas connected
in these propositions do agree. And yet I suppose, in such a case, the most rational persons would give full credit to things that they knew not by reason, but only by the revelation of the word of them that see. I suppose a person born blind in the manner described would nevertheless give full credit to the united testimony of the seeing world in things which they said about light and colors, and would entirely rest in their testimony.
If God gives us a revelation of the very truth, not only about spiritual beings, and concerning them in an unexperienced and unseen state, but also concerning a spiritual being or beings of a superior kind, and so of an unexperienced nature, entirely diverse [not only] from anything we do now experience in our present state, but from anything that we can be conscious or immediately sensible of in any state whatsoever that our nature can be in, then especially may mysteries be expected in such a revelation.
The truth concerning any kind of perceiving being of a different nature from ours, though of a kind inferior, might well be supposed to be attended with difficulty by reason of the diversity from what we are conscious of in ourselves. But much more so when the nature and kind is superior. For a superior perceptive nature may well be supposed, in some respects, to include and comprehend what belongs to an inferior, as the greater comprehends the less and as the whole includes a part, and therefore what the superior experiences may give him advantages to conceive of what belongs to the nature of the inferior. But on the contrary, an inferior nature don't include what belongs to a superior. When one of an inferior nature considers what belongs to a kind of beings of a nature entirely above his own, there is something belonging to it that is over and above all that the inferior nature is conscious of.
A very great superiority, even in beings of the same nature with ourselves, sets them so much above our reach, that many of their affairs become incomprehensible and attended with inexplicable intricacies. Thus many of the affairs of adult persons are incomprehensible, and appear inexplicably strange, to the understandings of little children; and many of the affairs of learned men and great philosophers and mathematicians, things which they are conversant in and well acquainted with, are far above the reach of the vulgar, and appear to them not only unintelligible but absurd and impossible and full of inconsistencies. But much more may this be expected when the superiority is not only in degree of improvement of the faculties and properties of the same, but also is a superiority of nature itself as to its kind.
So that if there be a kind of created, perceptive beings, in their nature vastly superior to the human nature—which none will deny to be impossible—and a revelation should be given us concerning the nature, acts and operations of this kind of creatures, it would be no wonder if such a revelation should contain some things very much out of our reach, attended with great difficulty to our reason, being things of such a kind that no improvement of our minds that we are capable of will bring us to an experience of anything like them.
But above all, if a revelation be made [to] us concerning that Being that is uncreated and self-existent, who is infinitely diverse from and above all others in his nature, and so infinitely above all that any improvement or advancement of our nature can give us any consciousness of, in such a revelation it would be very strange indeed if there should not be some great mysteries quite beyond our comprehension and attended with difficulties which it [is] impossible for us fully to solve and explain.
It may well be expected that a revelation of truth concerning an infinite Being should be attended with mystery. We find that the reasonings and conclusions of the best metaphysicians and mathematicians concerning infinites are attended with paradoxes and seeming inconsistencies. Thus it is concerning infinite lines, surfaces and solids, which are things external. But much more may this be expected in spiritual things, such as infinite thought and idea, infinite apprehension, infinite reason, infinite will, love, and joy, infinite spiritual power, agency, etc.
Nothing is more certain [than] that there must be unmade and unlimited Being. And yet the very notion of such a Being is all mystery, involving nothing but incomprehensible paradoxes and seeming inconsistencies.
It involves the notion of a Being self-existent and without any cause, which is utterly inconceivable and seems repugnant to all our ways of conception.
An infinite spiritual Being, or infinite understanding and will and spiritual power, must be omnipresent, without extension, which is nothing but mystery and seeming inconsistence.
The notion of an infinite Eternal implies absolute immutability. That which is in all respects infinite, and so absolutely perfect, and to the utmost degree and at all times, can't be in any respect variable. And this immutability, being constant from eternity, implies duration without succession, is wholly mystery and seeming inconsistence. It seems as much as to say an infinitely great or long duration all at once, or all in a moment,
which seems to be saying an infinitely great in an infinitely little, or an infinitely long line in a point without any length.
Infinite understanding, which implies an understanding of all things, of all existence, past, present and future, and of all truth, and all reason and argument—this implies infinite thought and reason. But how this can be absolutely without mutation or succession of acts seems mysterious and absurd. We can conceive of no such thing as thinking without successive acting of the mind about ideas. Perfect knowledge of all things, even of all the things of external sense, without any sensation or any reception of ideas from without, is inconceivable mystery. Infinite knowledge implies a perfect, comprehensive view of a whole future eternity, which seems utterly impossible: for how can there be any reaching of the whole of this to comprehend it, without reaching to the utmost limits of it? But this can't be where there is no such thing as utmost limits.
And again, if God perfectly views an eternal succession or chain of events, then he perfectly sees every individual part of that chain, and there is no one link of it hid from his sight. And yet there is no one link that he sees but that there is a link, yea, innumerable links, beyond it; from which it would seem to follow that there is a link beyond all the links that he sees, and consequently that there is one link, yea, unnumerable links, that he sees not, inasmuch as there are innumerable beyond every one that he sees. And many other like seeming contradictions might be mentioned which attend the supposition of God's omniscience.
If there be an absolute immutability in God, then there never arises any new act in God or new exertion of himself—and yet there arise new effects, which seems an utter inconsistence.
And so innumerable other such like mysteries and paradoxes are involved in the notion of an infinite and eternal intelligent Being, insomuch that, if there never had been any REVELATION by which God had made known himself by his word to mankind, the most speculative persons would, without doubt, have forever been exceedingly at a loss concerning the nature of the Supreme Being and First Cause of the universe. And that the ancient philosophers and wiser heathen had so good notions of God as they had, seems to [be] much more owing to tradition, which originated from divine revelation, than from their own invention, though human reason served to keep these traditions alive in the world, and led the more considerate to embrace and retain the imperfect traditions which were to be found in any parts remaining; they appearing, after once suggested and delivered, agreeable to reason.
If a revelation be made of the principal scheme of the wisdom of the supreme and infinitely wise ruler respecting his moral kingdom, wherein his all-sufficient wisdom is displayed in the case of its greatest trial, ordering and regulating the said moral kingdom to its great ends, when in the most difficult circumstances; extricating it out of the most extreme calamities in which it had been involved by the malice and subtlety of the chief and most crafty of all God's enemies; it being the principal of all the effects of the wisdom of him, the depth of whose wisdom [is] unsearchable and absolutely infinite; his deepest scheme, by which mainly the grand design of the universal, incomprehensibly complicated system of all his operations, and the infinite series of his administrations, is most happily, completely and gloriously attained; the scheme in which God's wisdom is mainly exercised and displayed: it may reasonably be expected that such a revelation will contain many mysteries.
We see that to be the case even as to many works of human wisdom and art. They appear strange, paradoxical and incomprehensible by those that are vastly inferior in sagacity, or entirely destitute of that skill or art. How are many of the effects of human artifice attended with many things that appear strange and altogether incomprehensible by children and many others, seeming to be beyond and against nature. And, in many cases, the effect produced not only seems to be beyond the power of any visible means, but inconsistent with being an effect, contrary to what would be expected. The means seem inconsistent with the end.
If God reveals the exact truth in those things which, in the language of the heathen sages, are matters of philosophy—i.e. not the things of sense and of common life, but matters of reflection and speculation, as especially things of morality and theology, things concerning the nature of the Deity, and the nature of man so far as related to the Deity, etc.—I say, if God reveals the real, precise truth concerning these things, it may most reasonably be expected that such a revelation should contain many mysteries and paradoxes, considering how many mysteries the doctrines of the greatest and best philosophers in all ages concerning these things have contained, or at least how very mysterious and seemingly repugnant they are to the reasons of the vulgar and persons of less understanding, and how mysterious the principles of philosophers, even concerning matters inferior far to those which are received for the most undoubted truth now, would have appeared in any former age, if they then had been revealed to be true, undoubted truths.
If God gives mankind his word in a large book, consisting of a vast variety
of parts, many books, histories, prophecies, prayers, songs, parables, proverbs, doctrines, promises, sermons, epistles and discourses of very many kinds, all connected together, all united in one grand drift and design, and one part having a various and manifold respect to others, so as to become one great work of God and, as it were, one grand system, as it is with the system of the universe with its vast variety of parts connected in one grand work of God; it may well be expected that there should be mysteries, things incomprehensible and exceeding difficult to our understanding, analogous to the mysteries that are found in all other works of God, as the works of creation and providence, and particularly such as are analogous to the mysteries that are observable in the system of the natural world and the frame of man's own nature.
For such a system (or Bible) of the word of God is as much the work of God as any other of his works, the effect of the power, wisdom and contrivance of a God whose wisdom is unsearchable and whose nature and ways are past finding out. And as the system of nature and the system of revelation are both divine works, so both are in different senses a divine word. Both are the voice of God to intelligent creatures, a manifestation and declaration of himself to mankind. Man's reason was given him that he might know God and might be capable of discerning the manifestations he makes of himself in the effects and external expressions and emanations of the divine perfections.
If it be still objected that 'tis peculiarly unreasonable that mysteries should be supposed in a revelation given to mankind, because if there be such a revelation, the direct and principal design of it must be to teach and instruct mankind, and so to enlighten and inform their understandings, which is inconsistent with its delivering things to man which he can't understand, and so don't inform and enlighten, but only puzzle and confound his understanding, I answer:
1. Men are capable of understanding as much as is revealed, and as much as is pretended to be revealed, though they can't understand everything that belongs to the things that are revealed, or although there are secret things pertaining to the things revealed which God has not revealed. As, for instance, God may reveal that there are three that have the same nature of the Deity, that 'tis most proper for us to look upon as three persons, though the particular manner of their distinction, or how they differ, may not be revealed. And we may therefore understand so much as is revealed concerning it. So he may reveal that the Godhead was united to man so as to be properly looked upon [as] the same person, but not reveal how it was effected.
2. No allowance is made in the objection for what may hereafter be understood of the word of God in future ages, which is not now understood. And it is to be considered that divine revelation is not given only for the present or past ages.
3. The seeming force of this objection lies wholly in this, that we must suppose whatever God does tends to answer the end for which he does it. But those parts of a revelation that we can't understand don't answer the end, inasmuch as informing our understandings is the very end of a revelation, if there be any such thing.
But this objection is no other than just equivalent to objections which may be made against many parts of the creation, particularly of this lower world. 'Tis apparent the most direct and principal end of this lower world was to be for the habitation, use and benefit of mankind, the head of this lower world. But here are some parts of it that seem to be of no use to him, but rather for his inconvenience and prejudice, as the innumerable stones and rocks that overspread so great a part of the land, which, as to anything known, are altogether useless and of ten times greater inconvenience than benefit.
Thus it is reasonable to expect that in such a revelation there should be many things plain and easy to be understood, and that the revelation should be most intelligible wherein it is most necessary for us to understand it in order to our guidance and direction in the way to our happiness; but that there should also be many incomprehensible mysteries in it, yea, many things very difficult to our reason, in that degree which we have attained of the use of it: many things understood in part, but yet that room should be left for vast improvement in the knowledge of them; that the revelation should be of such a nature, containing such depths and hidden treasures of knowledge, that there should be room for improvement in understanding, and to find out more and more, to all the wisest and best of men to the end of the world; and that the case in this respect should actually be the same as concerning the works of nature: that there should actually be a gradual improvement in the understanding of it; that many things that were formerly great and insuperable difficulties, unintelligible mysteries, should now, by further study and improvement, be well cleared up and cease to remain any difficulty; and that other difficulties should be considerably2 diminished, though not yet fully cleared up.
It may be expected that, as in the system of nature, so in this system of
revelation, there should be many parts whose use is but little understood, and many that should seem wholly useless, yea, and some that should seem rather to do hurt than good.
So I might further observe, that if we have a revelation given in ancient languages, used among a people whose customs and phraseology is but very imperfectly understood, then many difficulties should arise from hence; and that in a very short, concise history, where only some particular facts and circumstances that concern the special purpose and design of that revelation are mentioned, and innumerable others are omitted that would be proper to be mentioned if the main design were to give a clear, full account and clear idea [of the] connected, continued history of such a people or such affairs as the history mentions—I say, in such a case, 'tis no wonder that many doubts and difficulties arise.
