[1808 at 46355]
That disposition of mind which is a propensity to act contrary to reason, is a depraved disposition.
'Tis not because the faculty of reason, which God has given to mankind, is not sufficient fully to discover to 'em that forty, sixty, or an hundred years, is as nothing in comparison of eternity, infinitely less than a second of time to an hundred years, that the greatest worldly prosperity and pleasure is not treated with most perfect disregard, in all cases where there is any degree of competition of earthly things, with salvation from exquisite eternal misery, and the enjoyment of everlasting glory and felicity; as certainly it would be, if men acted according to reason.
But is it a matter of doubt or controversy, whether men in general don't show a strong disposition to act far otherwise, from their infancy, till death is in a sensible approach?
In things that concern men's temporal interest, they easily discern the difference between things of a long and short continuance.
'Tis no hard matter to convince men of the difference between a being admitted to the accommodations, and entertainments of a convenient, beautiful, well-furnished habitation, and to partake of the provisions and produce of a plentiful estate, for a day or a night; and having all given to them and settled upon them as their own, to possess as long as they live, and to be theirs, and their heirs' forever: there would be no need of men's preaching sermons, and spending their strength and life to convince men of the difference.
Men know how to adjust things in their dealings and contracts one with another, according to the length of time in which anything agreed for is to be used or enjoyed.
In temporal affairs, men are sensible that it concerns 'em to provide for future time, as well as for the present.
Thus common prudence teaches 'em to take care in summer to lay up for winter; yea, to provide a fund, and get a solid estate, whence they may be supplied for a long time to come.
And not only so, but they are willing and
forward to spend and be spent, to provide that which will stand their children in stead, after they are dead; though it be quite uncertain, who shall use and enjoy what they lay up, after they have left the world; and if their children should have the comfort of it, as they desire, they will not partake with them in that comfort, or have any more a portion in anything under the sun.
In things which relate to men's temporal interest, they seem very sensible of the uncertainty of life, especially of the lives of others; and to make answerable provision for the security of their worldly interest, that no considerable part of it may rest only on so uncertain a foundation, as the life of a neighbor or friend.
Common discretion leads men to take good care, that their outward possessions be well secured, by a good and firm title.
In worldly concerns, men are discerning of their opportunities, and careful to improve 'em before they are passed. The husbandman is careful to plow his ground, and sow his seed, in the proper season; otherwise he knows he can't expect a crop: and when the harvest is come, he will not sleep away the time; for he knows, if he does so, the crop will soon be lost. How careful and eagle-eyed is the merchant to observe and improve his opportunities and advantages, to enrich himself?
How apt are men to be alarmed at the appearance of danger to their worldly estate, or anything that remarkably threatens great loss or damage to their outward interest?
And how will they bestir themselves in such a case, if possible to avoid the threatened calamity? In things purely secular, and not of a moral or spiritual nature, men easily receive conviction by past experience, when anything, on repeated trial, proves unprofitable or prejudicial; and are ready to take warning by what they have found themselves, and also by the experience of their neighbors and forefathers.
But if we consider how men generally conduct themselves in things on which their well-being does infinitely more depend, how vast is the diversity? In these things, how cold, lifeless and dilatory?
With what difficulty are a few of multitudes excited to any tolerable degree of care and diligence, by the innumerable means used with men to make 'em wise for themselves?
And when some vigilance and activity is excited, how apt is it to die away, like a mere force against a natural tendency?
What need of a constant repetition of admonitions and counsels, to keep the heart from falling asleep?
How many objections are made? And how are difficulties magnified? And how soon is the mind discouraged?
How many arguments, and
often renewed, and variously and elaborately enforced, do men stand in need of, to convince 'em of things that are self-evident?
As that things which are eternal, are infinitely more important than things temporal, and the like.
And after all, how very few convinced effectually, or in such a manner as to induce to a practical preference of eternal things? How senseless are men of the necessity of improving their time to provide for futurity, as to their spiritual interest, and their welfare in another world?
Though it be an endless futurity, and though it be their own personal, infinitely important good, after they are dead, that is to be cared for, and not the good of their children, which they shall have no share in.
Though men are so sensible of the uncertainty of their neighbors' lives, when any considerable part of their estates depends on the continuance of them; how stupidly senseless do they seem to be of the uncertainty of their own lives, when their preservation from immensely great, remedy-less and endless misery, is risked by a present delay, through a dependence on future opportunity?
What a dreadful venture will men carelessly and boldly run, and repeat and multiply, with regard to their eternal salvation, who are very careful to have everything in a deed or bond firm, and without a flaw?
How negligent are they of their special advantages and opportunities for their soul's good?
How hardly awakened by the most evident and imminent dangers, threatening eternal destruction, yea, though put in mind of 'em, and much pains taken to point them forth, show them plainly, and fully to represent them, if possible to engage their attention to 'em?
How are they like the horse, that boldly rushes into the battle? How hardly are men convinced by their own frequent and abundant experience, of the unsatisfactory nature of earthly things, and the instability of their own hearts in their good frames and intentions?
And how hardly convinced by their own observation, and the experience of all past generations, of the uncertainty of life and its enjoyments? Psalms 49:11, etc., "Their inward thought is, that their houses shall continue forever. . . . Nevertheless, man being in honor, abideth not; he is like the beasts that perish. This their way is their folly: yet their posterity approve their sayings. Like sheep are they laid in the grave."
In these things, men that are prudent for their temporal interest, act as if they were bereft of reason: "They have eyes, and see not; ears, and hear not; neither do they understand: They are like the horse and mule, that have no understanding" [Mark 8:18, Psalms 32:9].
Jeremiah 8:7, "The stork in the heaven knoweth her appointed times; and the turtle, and the crane, and the swallow, observe the time of their coming: but my people know not the judgment of the Lord."
These things are often mentioned in Scripture, as evidences of extreme folly and stupidity, wherein men act as great enemies to themselves, as though they loved their own ruin (Proverbs 8:36), laying wait for their own blood (Proverbs 1:18).
And how can these things be accounted for, but by supposing a most wretched depravity of nature?
Why otherwise should not men be as wise for themselves in spiritual and eternal things, as in temporal?
All Christians will confess, that man's faculty of reason was given him chiefly to enable him to understand the former, wherein his main interest, and true happiness consists. This faculty would therefore undoubtedly be every way as fit for the understanding of them, as the latter, if not depraved.
The reason why these are understood and not the other, is not that such things as have been mentioned, belonging to men's spiritual and eternal interest, are more obscure and abstruse in their own nature.
For instance, the difference between long and short, the need of providing for futurity, the importance of improving proper opportunities, and of having good security, and a sure foundation, in affairs wherein our interest is greatly concerned, etc., these things are as plain in themselves in religious matters, as in other matters.
And we have far greater means to assist us to be wise for ourselves in eternal, than in temporal things. We have the abundant instruction of perfect and infinite wisdom itself, to lead and conduct us in the paths of righteousness, so that we may not err.
And the reasons of things are most clearly, variously and abundantly set before us in the word of God; which is adapted to the faculties of mankind, tending greatly to enlighten and convince the mind: whereas, we have no such excellent and perfect rules to instruct and direct us in things pertaining to our temporal interest, nor anything to be compared to it.
If any should say, 'tis true, if men gave full credit to what they are told concerning eternal things, and these appeared to 'em as real and certain things, it would be an evidence of a sort of madness in them, that they show no greater regard to 'em in practice: but there is reason to think, this is not the case; the things of another world, being unseen things, appear to men as things of a very doubtful nature, and attended with great uncertainty.
In answer, I would observe, agreeable to what has been cited from Mr. Locke, though eternal
things were considered in their bare possibility, if men acted rationally, they would infinitely outweigh all temporal things in their influence on their hearts.
And I would also observe, that the supposing eternal things not to be fully believed, at least by them who enjoy the light of the gospel, does not weaken, but rather strengthen the argument for the depravity of nature.
For the eternal world being what God had chiefly in view in the creation of men, and the things of this world being made to be wholly subordinate to other, man's state here being only a state of probation, preparation and progression, with respect to the future state, and so eternal things being in effect men's all, their whole concern: to understand and know which it chiefly was, that they had understanding given 'em; and it concerning them infinitely more to know the truth of eternal things than any other, as all that are not infidels will own; therefore, we may undoubtedly conclude, that if men have not respect to 'em as real and certain things, it cannot be for want of sufficient evidence of their truth, to induce 'em so to regard them; especially as to them that live under that light, which God has appointed as the most proper exhibition of the nature and evidence of these things:
but it must be from a dreadful stupidity of mind, occasioning a sottish insensibility of their truth and importance, when manifested by the clearest evidence.
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